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Introduction
The popularization of Area Studies in the USA during the Cold War was driven by international political 
considerations, in particular the need to produce knowledge about so-called enemy countries -  communist 
states. As the political systems of the major representatives of the communist bloc - USSR, China, North 
Korea -  developed the phenomenon of personality cults, it consequently became an important subject 
for Area Studies scholars, as well as its new concept. They approached this phenomenon through multi­
disciplinary culturally and historically contextualized studies instead of applying macro-historical theories 
based on the Western experience (Szanton, 2002: 5-11).
The term "personality cult" became popular after Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret speech" at the 20th 
Party Congress in 1956, when he used it to explain the consolidation of Stalin's personal dictatorship, 
the ensuing abuses of power and the extraordinary adulation of Stalin (Rees, 2004:3). Since then the 
term has had a highly negative connotation and is associated with the notorious human rights abuses 
of Stalinism, as well as the regimes of Mao Zedong, Adolf Hitler and the Kim family in North Korea.
The term, personality cult, when applied to modern politics, usually refers to the practice of 
non-democratic regimes to promote an idealized image of a leader with the aid of modern mass media 
in order to generate personal worship in a society.
Although the practice of personality cults in modern states arguably started with the Russian 
leader Stalin's decision to place the corpse of Vladimir Lenin on public display after Lenin's death in 
1924 (Rutland, 2011:365), the spirit of the phenomenon is extremely ancient. "The deification of dead 
emperors and then of living emperors was used to legitimize personal power in ancient Greece and Rome, 
especially with the dynasty of Augustus" (Rees, 2004:7). However, technology improvements utilized in 
mass media and police monitoring activities have made modern states more capable of creating and 
sustaining a personality cult.
The popularity of the personality cult as a research topic in Sino, Soviet and Korean studies can 
be explained by a specific approach undertaken by foreign scholars studying the policies and politics of 
these states (these studies are also known as Kremlinology). The lack of reliable information and the highly 
opaque decision making structures in these communist states have made it necessary for Kremlinologists 
to read between the lines and employ such empirical data as the physical position of members of the 
inner circles during parades, the wording in newspaper articles, the presence or absence of slogans and 
phrases in documents, etc. That also explains why they focused on the visible actors -  leaders -  and 
therewith shaped the research of personality cults. "In identifying cleavages and controversies within the 
Soviet leadership, Kremlinologists have tended to emphasize personal alignments, overstate personal 
power struggles and downgrade policy issues to mere instruments in the fight for supremacy" (Jonsson, 
1977:132).
With the end of the Cold War a new understanding of the personality cult has begun to develop. 
It has been argued that this concept should be put in a broader context of person-centered modern 
symbolic politics, opening up vistas for comparisons with Western democracies. According to E.A. Rees 
(2004:7) "embryonic cults exist even in relatively open, democratic political systems". These are not 
personality cults in the full form, but they resemble them in some respects. So the ghost of the personality 
cult is not peculiar to non-democratic states, but the political and social conditions in non-democratic 
states serve as a more comfortable hotbed in which it can grow.
The first section of the working paper will provide a theoretic framework for the analysis of 
personality cults: from Weber's theory of charismatic authority to theoretical developments specifically
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related to personality cults. The following sections will present case studies of subjects of the most famous 
personality cults: Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, and also look into more recent developments, such as 
the idolization of Vladimir Putin in modern Russia.
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1. Theoretic background
1.1 Weber's Charismatic Authority
Most scholarly work on personality cults is based on or at least inspired by the tripartite classification 
of authority developed by the famous sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). It has been argued that 
the leadership systems of the twentieth century which generated personality cults might be seen as 
embodying what Weber characterized as charismatic authority or its routinization. Therefore this chapter 
will present an outline of Weberian theory of charismatic authority and its connection to personality cults.
According to Weber, a state is a "relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, which 
rests on the legitimate use of violence" (Weber, Lassman, & Speirs, 1994:311). This means that for a state 
to remain in existence, those who are ruled must submit to the leadership claimed by whoever rules at 
any given time. In Weber's view inner justifications, such as people's belief in the existence of a legitimate 
order in a particular system, are the main reasons for obedience and provide a reliable basis for authority. 
Political power is considered legitimate when it is exercised both with a consciousness on the part of 
the elite that it has a right to govern and with recognition by the ruled of that right (Lane, 1984:207).
Weber famously outlined the three ideal types of legitimate authority, whose validity of the 
claims to rule are based on traditional, legal-rational or charismatic grounds.
• Traditional authority rests on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions 
and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them" (Weber et al., 1994:312). The 
legitimacy of such an authority derives from tradition, habit and cultural beliefs, e.g. the divine 
rights of a king in monarchies or paternal authority.
• Legal-rational authority is "a rule by virtue of 'legality, by virtue of belief in the validity of 
legal statute and the appropriate juridical 'competence' founded on rationally devised rules" 
(Weber et al., 1994:312). In such a system, obedience is owed not to a person, but to a set of 
impersonal principles.
• The basis of charismatic authority is "the entirely personal devotion to, and personal trust in, 
revelations, heroism, or other qualities of leadership in an individual" (Weber et al., 1994:312). 
The aim of a personality cult is to generate similar attitudes to the leader.
Weber defined charisma as"a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered 
extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least especially exceptional 
powers or qualities" (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978:241). It is not so much what the leader is, but how he 
is regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, that is decisive for the validity of charisma. In this 
light, the establishment of personality cult represents an attempt to generate perceptions of a leader as 
a possessor of superior qualities in society or in other words to "manufacture charisma" to support the 
legitimacy of his rule. By means of mass media manipulation not only a false appearance of the leader 
as a person, but also of his many successes and rare failures, are presented to the public.
Wherever charismatic leadership appears, it constitutes a "call", a "mission" or a "spiritual duty" 
(Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978:244). For a personality cult to take shape a leader also has to convey to a 
society that he has an important"mission" (for more information see chapter 2.3). Followers'responsiveness 
to such a call implies whether and to what extent there is a special need for it in that society. The social 
and historical conditions that generate charismatic leadership can be best understood through the
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concept of the charismatic situation: perception of crisis accompanied by perceived inability of current 
political institutions to overcome it (Pinto, Eatwell, & Larsen, 2007). The same logic applies to the historical 
and social context (real or perceived as a result of manipulation) required for successful generation of 
a personality cult. "The charismatic leader has to demonstrate his extraordinary leadership qualities in 
the process of summoning people to join in a movement for change and in leading such a movement" 
(Tucker, 1968:738).
Although, personality cults in modern political systems follow Weber's theory of charismatic 
authority in many ways, his claim about the correlation of charismatic legitimacy grounds with a certain 
structure of rule (absence of bureaucracy and administrative organs) and instability of the system 
(unstable and transitory character) finds little evidence in empirical cases. This is why personality cults 
in recent history might be better understood through the concept of routinized charisma. Because 
charismatic authority cannot remain stable in its pure form for a long time, it will undergo a transformation, 
a routinization in Weber's terminology, in a traditional or rational-legal direction. Usually as the result of 
routinization, charismatic leadership transforms from an extraordinary and purely personal relationship 
into an established authority structure. However, the elements of charismatic authority can be retained 
through artificial means. After the revolutionary period is over, the old or the new leader might make 
intentional attempts to establish a personality cult in such a way as to institutionalize permanent 
leadership roles associated with charisma.
Although different modes of routinization are possible, Weber states that charismatic leadership 
is most likely to transform into a patrimonial form that will be discussed later in this unit (Weber et al., 
1978:244).
1.2 Personality cult as a relationship: Response of followers
A personality cult is not complete with only charisma on the leader's side. It requires certain mental 
conditions on the part of both the leader and the followers. Weber points out that the response of 
followers is a necessary condition for charismatic authority to function, as no single person, however 
charismatic, can be worshiped unless his charisma is acknowledged by followers. Tucker identifies the 
gathering of "a group of persons who cluster around the charismatic personality and accept his authority" 
as the initial phase in any charismatic movement (Tucker 1968: 739).
Personality cult is the same. To further understand the phenomenon, it is helpful to see it as a 
social relation between the two parts. Foucault's (1980) metaphor of power relations is illuminative in 
thinking about cult as a pattern of interaction:
"Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed through a net-like organization. And 
not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power (p. 98)"
In this light, personality cult is not an entity that can be "possessed" and "used" whenever and 
wherever the leader wishes. It is not a unidirectional dynamic, in which only the leader dominates or 
only the followers worship. Rather, it is a combination of two directions: a leader-follower direction of 
charisma displaying and adherents gathering, and a follower-leader direction of charisma perception, 
acknowledgment, and devotion. Followers must accept the leader as"supremely authoritative". Although
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the code of conduct between the leader and followers may vary under different political circumstances, 
a common hallmark they share is that the leader can effectively exercise a kind of real "domination" or 
"control" over the followers.
What makes it possible to establish and sustain relations of this kind? Tucker (1968) provides 
one explanation that involves societal conditions and social feelings. He argues that a personality cult 
often arises when prevailing dissatisfaction over the current situation deepens to the point of "distress", 
and when "extraordinary leader-personalities come forward with appeals of a salvationist character, 
persuasively proclaiming the possibility of overcoming the situation of distress, pointing to ways of 
doing so, and offering their own leadership along this path to those who are willing to follow (p. 743)".
The "distress" can be induced by ongoing social injustice, economic difficulty, threat to national 
integrity or to other forms of group identity, etc. Also, it can be an expression of anxieties brought forth by 
modernity: people used to village community life suddenly are thrown into urban- or nation-oriented life 
in which sense of belonging blurs, and many habits and traditions regulating life since time immemorial 
are disrupted or discarded. At this juncture, if one person appears with the ability to grant meaningful 
identity and sense of belonging to the society, with asserted capability and promise to lead the people 
to that new life, he or she will certainly find an overwhelming number of followers.
1.3 "What for?" The mission
Each personality embodies a mission to be realized. The mission is usually a vision of the future based on 
a certain ideology that the leader represents. There is an academic dispute about the relative importance 
of the mission compared to the leader's personal charisma. Do followers commit themselves to the 
leader because of leader's personal charm, or because of the stirring content of the mission the leader 
represents? Scholars have different assessments regarding this question (cf. Wolpe, 1968). But the 
consensus is, without a mission behind it, a personality cult can hardly form. Even if it can, it is highly 
vulnerable to criticism and will quickly abate. The mission is both a critical element bonding the leader 
and followers together, and a direction in which they intend to proceed.
Missions are generally novel and radical and cannot possibly be achieved within the reach of an 
ordinary human being, thus undergirding the value of the leader (e.g. Trice & Beyer 1986, Bryman 1992). 
But to woo programmatic support, the mission should be accompanied by more detailed and practical 
aims that satisfy the needs of society and its individual members. In real practice, such missions are 
oftentimes depicted as an ideology that promises a final solution to the problems of modernity, or to the 
more imminent difficulties the society or nation faces. A utopian future of a united and content public is 
provided to the distressed and anxious crowd. The articulation of the mission must also take the potential 
followers' frame of reference into consideration, otherwise it risks not being understood or believed. 
Followers are also prone to accept an account expressed in a way they feel at ease in understanding. 
Missions delivered so are more attractive and desirable. It is unsurprising that a well-conveyed mission 
of the leader can bolster the cult into a religious kind of mass movement.
1.4 Institutionalization of the personal cult
The reception of a leader's charisma and the embodiment of a higher mission in the leader are not 
sufficient to ensure the cult's endurance. In a modern political system, once a cult has been erected,
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institutionalizing it as part of everyday practice with defined code to follow is necessary to sustain it.
A cult will always diminish if it is not sustained, it may decay or diminish even before the death 
of the leader. Periodical proof must be furnished of the powers claimed by the leader. So leaders see 
institutionalization as an inevitable phase in the development of a personality cult.
The institutionalization of the personality cult refers to a wide array of practices to codify the 
commitment to the leader and the mission he/she embodies as an integral part of the political, social, 
economic, and cultural systems the followers live in. Codification is the process in which disciplines 
in behavioral and intellectual practices relating to the leader and the mission are defined. The aim is 
to insert practices of the cult of personality into the indispensable working and living systems of its 
followers, so that the spirit of the cult is continuously repeated and reaffirmed, and eventually becomes 
psychologically persistent in the followers' minds.
Institutionalization includes commemorative events and formularized practices. A wide variety 
of measures can be taken to institutionalize the cult, ranging from choosing the leader's successor(s), 
establishing an organizational structure for routine reiteration of devotion to the leader and the mission, 
and integrating the spirit of the cult with daily economic and living practices.
The institutionalization of the personality cult functions mainly by generating "institutionalized 
awe" (Kanter, 1968) of the personality through "organizational sagas" (Clark, 1972). Organizational saga 
refers to the processes whereby odes to the leader and his/her contribution to the mission become 
embedded in all working institutions of the society, and eventually engraved in the minds of the entire 
society. Stories, depictions, any fragments attesting to the superiority of the leader are so dispersed and 
deeply rooted that the cult develops as an omnipresent part of all institutions. To live in such a context 
is to be submerged by an "institutionalized awe", which is dispersed throughout the entire society.
1.5 Patrimonialism and the personality cult
Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are other important theoretical concepts that denote personalized 
aspects of state administration. According to Max Weber patrimonialism is a sub-type of traditional 
domination that occurs when authority is based on ties of personal loyalty and personal dependency 
between a leader (patron) and his administrative staff (clients). Neo-patrimonialism is used to describe 
modern regimes, in which power, material resources and rents are distributed personally by the leader 
as if they were his/her private property. This system of authority exists behind some formal, impersonal 
elements of governance, such as the legal system or the administrative code (Kelsall, 2011:76-77). 
"Neopatrimonial regimes are based not only on patriarchal values and norms, but on rationally driven 
exchange of services, when a patron buys the loyalty of a client in exchange for protection of client's 
interests" (Ilkhamov, 2007:66).
According to Richard Pipes the existence of patrimonial features in modern states (in the USSR in 
particular, but his theory can be applied to other states as well) can be explained by historical continuity 
and enduring cultural patterns. "Through much of her history she (Russia) was ruled by an extreme form 
of autocracy, under which the tsar not only enjoyed unlimited legislative, judiciary, and executive powers 
but literally owned the country, in that he could, at will, exploit its human and material resources" (Pipes, 
2001). The patrimonial political system (also called political culture) was formed in the Muscovite state1
1 Muscovy -  is another name of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, a medieval Russian polity, which existed between 1283 and 
Ivan IV's proclamation of Muscovite Tsardom.
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and endured through the Bolshevik regime, because there was no counterweight to autocracy in the 
society with a large, passive working class and a small and weak middle class (Pipes, 2007:181). After 
democracy was rejected, Bolsheviks had nothing but to return to well-known tsarist practices, one of 
them being the veneration of cult of the tsar.
In China "the patrimonial model had been developed and consolidated during the Warring 
States Period through the Han period, and thereafter was retained as a dependable, satisfactory means 
of organizing the polity" (Eisenberg, 1998:98).
1.6 Totalitarianism and personality cult
The modern political system best suited to institutionalize a personality cult is a totalitarian one. And 
in fact, most personality cults in modern history originated from totalitarian regimes— most notably 
Germany under Adolph Hitler (1933-1945), the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin (1922-1953), and 
China under Mao Zedong (1949-1976). Totalitarianism refers to a political structure in which the state 
monopolizes authority over the nation and controls public and private activities in every possible way.
In their seminal work, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) 
identify the main traits peculiar to totalitarian regimes: (a) a single mass party led by one man, embodying 
an elaborate guiding ideology, (b) the state's monopoly of violence, plus a terror system centered on 
secret police organizations that engage in omnipresent surveillance and punishment, (c) total control 
of information and communication to promote propaganda in support of the regime and to mute 
opposition, and (d) use of force and economic activity via a controlled and planned economy. Such traits 
can be identified especially in those regimes of Hitler and Stalin, and are also referential to analyzing 
other cases.
Needless to say, the latter traits can effectively facilitate the creation and sustaining of the cult of 
personality, usually by the leader of the regime. However, there is still a deeper reason why totalitarianism 
is closely connected with personality cults. The cause is to be found in genetic theories of totalitarianism. 
In this regard, Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) must be noted. She argues that 
totalitarianism is a product of modernity. Colonialism and the emergence of mass society undermine 
the distinctiveness of the individual while it strengthens the significance of the group identity, be it 
racial, ethnic, or national in essence. Thus, expansion and advancement of the interests of the group 
took the paramount priority, and sacrificing the individual for this aim became moral and necessary. And 
totalitarian regimes— Germany under Hitler and the Soviet Union under Stalin in Arendt's analysis — are 
examples of the fanatical creation of political systems, induced by a unique set of factors, to materialize 
this goal. Political life is marked by perpetual movement and fading of the line between the private 
and the public, and between the individual and the collective. So Arendt thinks totalitarianism can be 
sustained only in a closed logic system, in which the interests and goals of the group are unified and 
personalized into the political leader. The social mind works in singularity rather than in plurality, and 
any alien idea or information is forbidden or minimized. This all, in effect, breeds the cult of personality.
Totalitarianism is generally considered to be an undesirable political system because it emphasizes 
an indisputable group ideology, an oftentimes irrational cult of the leader and centralized control over 
every aspect of the society, in which individual personality and independent thinking is depressed, 
but from a utilitarian viewpoint, it can be quite effective for some economically "backward" countries, 
especially for those on the stage of industrialization and modernization. Alexander Gerschenkron (1963)
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argues that the economic and political requirements for early industrialized countries are rather different 
from those facing late industrialized countries. The former face less competition and a simpler, lower- 
capital market context; while the latter face fiercer competition and much more complex, massive and 
expensive market conditions— the entry costs for the world economy have increased. To afford those costs 
requires greater collective mobilization, which in turn requires greater central control and coordination. 
To this end, a strong personality cult, sustained and strengthened by a totalitarian regime, can prove to 
be far more competent to swiftly mobilize resources, unify social ideology, discipline the bureaucratic 
system, and coordinate different economic and social sectors. This argument also has found resonance 
in Russia and China (Moore 1966).
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2. Case 1: USSR/Russia
2.1 Stalin's personality cult
"Sunny prospects are open to us,
The flames o f victory blaze over the country,
Comrade Stalin lives for our happiness,
Our wise leader, our teacher dear."
-  "The song of Stalin" by M. Blantner and S. Surkov (Heller & Plamper, 2004:45)
The song quoted above is an example of how by the end of the 1940s Joseph Stalin symbolically figured 
in Soviet public life in myriad ways as an object of reverence. The extraordinary cult of veneration 
around the figure of the leader burst on to the public scene in 1929 and reached its climax with the 
seventieth anniversary of Stalin's birth in 1949. Although it is impossible to evaluate how people actually 
perceived Stalin back in the 1920-1950s, it would be wrong to say that devotion to him existed only in 
state propaganda and wasn't shared by the public. Research conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace found out that even in 2013, sixty years after Stalin's death and more than twenty 
years after the collapse of Soviet Union, he still commanded worryingly high levels of admiration among 
Russian people (Lipman, Gudkov, & Bakradze, 2013).
How was it possible for such a worship of Stalin to develop in the materialist regime of USSR? 
Why and for what was it created? One popular explanation holds that Stalin, like other dictators, was a 
glory-seeker fond of displaying his power and enjoyed the adulation of the Soviet people and communists 
abroad. This is contradicted by another existing opinion, that the cult is best understood as an attempt 
to mobilize support and construct legitimacy for the post-revolutionary, post-Lenin rule of Stalin. To 
understand the historical and political context of its development, it is important first to have a closer 
look at Stalin's predecessor -  Vladimir Lenin.
2.1.1 The charismatic predecessor: Vladimir Lenin
In many ways Lenin's role in Russian history supports the theory of charismatic authority. In the beginning 
of the 20th century, events in Russia resembled very closely what has been described as the charismatic 
situation by continuators of Weberian theory. Nationwide crises erupted in political, economic and social 
spheres, while the dissatisfaction with autocratic monarchy of the Romanov family and later on with 
provisional government, which took over after February revolution, created a demand for alternative 
leadership. In this situation Lenin's aim to change an oppressive regime into a communist society was a 
revolutionary "mission" typical for charismatic authority.
Initially Lenin had a small group of followers -  Bolsheviks: "to be a Bolshevik in the early years was 
not so much to accept a particular set of beliefs as it was to gravitate into the orbit of Lenin as political 
mentor, revolutionary strategist and personality"(Robert N. Tucker quoted in Jowitt, 1993:5). So, although 
Lenin didn't have any "supernatural qualities" as described by Weber, he was perceived to be superior 
by his supporters and therefore can be claimed to have had "charisma". Lenin's charisma was reaffirmed 
after the success of October revolution, which gave him "a form of popular legitimacy directly related 
to the ideological zeal of the revolutionary period itself, perpetuated into the post-revolutionary period 
and projected into his image" (Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:400).
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Typical for charismatic authority, the rule of the early Bolshevik leaders was lacking in formal 
structure. The political power derived more "from informal, personalized power bases than from 
occupation of specific positions in the party/state hierarchy. Lenin stridently denounced bureaucrats, 
and bureaucratic methods and attitudes, for impeding the implementation of the communist program" 
(Andreas, 2007:441).
2.1.2 'Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live': retaining Lenin's charisma and the rise of Stalin's 
cult
The death of Lenin in 1924 put the legitimacy of the newly established Soviet political system in question. 
In order to legitimize his personal rule Stalin and the Party tried to retain elements of Lenin's charismatic 
leadership and transfer them to his successor. According to David Brandenburger, the society was too 
poorly educated to grasp the philosophical tenets of the Party line, and there was no middle class, so 
party ideologists decided to cultivate tsar-like personal devotion as a new way to mobilize loyalty. Built 
on association with Lenin, Stalin's personality cult was a manufactured application, not something that 
spontaneously emerged throughout the population during the course of the transformational period 
(Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:402).
Another version holds that the Stalin cult was the result of a power struggle in the Bolshevik Party 
inner circles (Ennker, 2004) and disagreements about the economic and political policies of the USSR. 
The personality cult served Stalin to eliminate influential party members who were oppositional to him, 
such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, etc.
First, a cult of personality was developed around Lenin, the founding father of Soviet communism, 
in order to later shift the focus to Stalin. The aim was to institutionalize the permanent leadership 
roles associated with charisma. Right after Lenin's death in 1924, the Party undertook certain steps to 
"immortalize" the dead leader's memory. "An institute was established to study his brain, a mausoleum 
was erected to house his remains, and his relics were preserved in church-like museums" (Rees, 20 04:62)
Stalin promoted Lenin's primacy in philosophy, presenting him as not only the party's erstwhile 
politico-ideological chief, but also its philosophical leader. At the same time Stalin himself and the 
mobilized "subservient, young, would-be disciples" started a critique campaign against other important 
Soviet Marxist philosophers, such as Plekhanov. "By thus putting supreme philosophical authority into 
Lenin's role, Stalin helped the philosophers to grasp this broadened conception of that role as applicable 
to Lenin's successor" (Tucker, 1979:352). Indeed Stalin was portrayed as "the foremost interpreter and/ 
or source of post-Lenin communism in the former Soviet Union" (Strong & Killingsworth, 2011). That is 
how there "appeared the holy quartet - Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin - who together became the symbolic 
centerpiece of Stalinist thought and culture" (Tucker, 1979:352).
2 A video about Vladimir Lenin dedicated to his funeral in 1924 can be found at: [https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Rie3dkLPlRA]
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The history of Bolshevism was rewritten in order to present Stalin in the center of revolutionary movement 
by placing him as the constant companion of Lenin at important revolutionary events: creation of the 
Bolshevik party, victory in the October Revolution, construction of the first socialist government in the 
world, establishment of the Red Army, etc (Gill, 1980:168). An excellent example of this type of revision is 
found in an article published in Pravda newspaper, in which a book on Comintern3 history was denounced 
because Stalin's name was only mentioned twice in its analysis (Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:404). Lenin 
was slowly effaced by his successor.
All the steps mentioned above, such as the 'editing' of history, were possible only because 
between 1929 and 1932 Stalin attained full control over Soviet media, so there was not a single non-Party 
publication left, nor any private publishing houses that could have served as vehicles for opposition views 
(Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:404). The famous Bolshevik newspaper Pravda was no longer an arena for 
debates between influential political theorists, but the mouthpiece of Stalin's propaganda.
Thus analyzed through the prism of Weber's legitimacy theory, by creating the cults Stalin 
attempted to legitimize his new leadership position on both traditional and charismatic grounds: 1) as 
Lenin's successor; 2) as possessor of superior qualities symbolic to the Soviet regime.
2.1.3 Progression of the cult: expanding mission, reaffirming charisma
The cult, like any other social relation, was dynamic. If during the first years of his rule Stalin was described 
as "the apprentice revolutionary and Lenin's pupil and heir", later his role was expanded to "the defender 
of the state; the prophet, apostle, and teacher; the builder of the new world; the inspirer of his people, 
whose bounteous good fortune was to live under his rule" (Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:404). So with time 
Stalin's extraordinary qualities were propagated and adjusted in response to the changing environment 
of the Soviet Union, regime priorities, and the needs of the "followers". The same thing can be said about
3 The Comintern, or the Communist International, was an international communist organization, which was founded in 
Moscow in 1919 and dissolved by Stalin in 1943.
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Stalin's "missions", while building socialism was one of the most ambitious and long term ones.
Although the revolutionary period was over, the time of Stalin's rule was certainly not free of 
distress; some Western scholars have even labeled the period of collectivization and industrialization 
as "the Third Revolution". Yet the charismatic situation needed for legitimacy of charismatic leadership 
was also partly "orchestrated". It was done through warnings about cruelty of the capitalist West and 
cultivating the perception of the nation under threat from malicious enemies. As Benno Ennker puts it, 
"the propagation of scenarios of threat was internalized by followers of the regime and ultimately created 
a paranoid culture" (Heller & Plamper, 2004:163). This generated a feeling of weakness and helplessness 
within the population that significantly helped to maintain the cult.
Stalin's regime also had some real achievements that can be to some extent attributed to the 
ability of totalitarian regimes to foster mobilization. The impressive buildup of heavy industry, the huge 
new towns, and the Moscow Metro were all identified with the leader and gave the cult an extra base 
(Strong & Killingsworth, 2011:407). Victory in the Second World War, more than anything, helped to 
consolidate Stalin's position as the single leader with the capacity to defend Soviet national interests. 
State-controlled media glorified his valor and competent leadership in the war as decisive for the victory 
over fascist Germany. Thus, the charisma of the leader was reaffirmed. At the same time Stalin was never 
associated with the catastrophic policy failures of the Soviet regime, such as collectivization in 1930, 
the famine of 1932/3, and the suddenness of the German invasion in 1941, which instead were blamed 
on local officials (Rees, 2004:14). State propaganda projected an image of the political situation in the 
Soviet Union such that people would develop a perception that while life might be difficult, only Stalin 
could fix the problems.
2.1.4 Institutionalization of the cult
As indicated in the theoretical part of this unit, for a cult to be successfully operating for a long time it 
is essential that the leader and his/her contribution to the mission become engraved in the minds of all 
the society members.
In the Soviet Union the omnipresence of Stalin was assured in a great variety of ways. Factories, 
mines, cities, schools, and sanatoriums as well as different kinds of prizes and awards bore his name. 
Millions of his portraits and statues adorned public spaces all over the country. The Stalin cult was an 
overwhelmingly visual phenomenon, tailored to a population with high illiteracy rates. However, not 
only fine arts and sculpture, but also literature, poetry, music and film works of that period exhibited 
fawning devotion to Stalin and were later called Staliniana (Heller & Plamper, 2004:169).
As mentioned earlier, state-controlled mass media was projecting nonstop the image of Stalin as 
the indispensable leader of the Soviet Union. Publications of individual and collective letters of gratitude 
from workers to Stalin in the newspapers were an interesting feature of the period. They were first initiated 
by the Party to create the illusion of mass support, but later reproduced themselves without coercion 
from above (Heller & Plamper, 2004:168).
Establishment of Stalin-related rituals and traditions was another technique adopted by Soviet 
regime. Among the new post-revolution holidays in the Stalinist Soviet Union, the most important date 
in the calendar was the birthday of the leader. The grandeur and scope of the celebrations, especially on 
Stalin's fiftieth, sixtieth and seventieth birthdays, were striking. The ceremonies very much recall those
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of religious holidays, as during the parades, banners with portraits of Stalin (together with Marx, Engels 
and Lenin) were carried like icons4.
2.1.5 Neo-patrimonialism
An important element of Soviet political structure under Stalin was patron-client relationships or neo- 
patrimonialism. Stalin himself rose to power as Lenin's protégé, advancing the careers of his supporters 
from whom he required personal loyalty rather than a commitment to their positions. Stalin's personal 
preoccupation with exceptional control over the party contributed to "revitalization of patronage and neo- 
patrimonial practices", including cult like veneration (lIkhamov, 2007:75). Having become an indispensable 
leader, he was even more appealing as a patron and attracted more clients that were ready to support 
his rule. Thus, cult of personality constituted a non-bureaucratic form of communication between Stalin 
and lower rungs of the new bureaucratic administration (Gill, 1980:183). The neo-patrimonialism was 
reproduced by Stalin's deputies at the lower levels of hierarchy (Brooks, 2003:53). To join the party new 
members had to get recommendations from an existing member, who as a result, became their patrons. 
This is how the new ruling class was created "based not on ownership of property but on its control of 
the state, which in turn controlled the working class" (Agnotti, 1988:14).
2.1.6 Stalin's death: dismantling the cult
The death of Stalin in 1953 witnessed scenes of mass public grieving accompanied by widespread 
panic over the possible collapse of the country, which supports the argument that a personality cult 
succeeded in generating genuine devotion to the leader in the society. However, steps were soon taken 
by the Party to curtail the most excessive manifestations of the cult. Finally, Khrushchev's Secret Report 
and denunciation of the Stalin cult at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 dealt a major blow to the whole 
belief system of the Soviet people. Thus, as put by Strong and Killingworth (2011:408), Stalin's death 
caused a "traumatic crisis of faith". The Party addressed this legitimacy crisis by restoring the semblance 
of collective leadership, which in part involved a restoration of other cultic objects -  "the restoration of 
Lenin's cult, the reappraisal of Marxism-Leninism, the restoration of the cult of the Revolution, and the 
new emphasis on the USSR and the people" (Rees, 2004:21).
2.2 Putin's personality cult
The legitimacy of Vladimir Putin's presidency in 2000 was formally based on democratic and legal 
procedures, as the constitution of 1993 created all the institutions necessary for a liberal democratic 
state. However, over time the political order in Russia has made a significant move in the authoritarian 
direction5, which at least in theory is supposed to undermine the regime's legitimacy and, therefore,
4 A footage of Joseph Stalin 70th birthday celebrations in 1949 can be found at: [https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=7hzkpjntPvs]
5 One reason behind this turn is the perceived (by Russian society) failure of the representative, liberal democracy 
that was tried in the 1990s (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014). Lilia Shevtsova argues that Yeltsin's regime was an electoral 
autocracy and Putin's authoritarianism is only its genuine continuation (Lo & Shevtsova, 2012). In the framework of Pipes' 
theory this turn can be seen as historical continuity: in the situation of no experience of democracy, the old cultural 
archetypes, both Czarist and Soviet, began to rise in prominence. The external factors, such as the success of the "colored
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would result in "punishment" by the electorate or simply political unrest. One of the main reasons this 
hasn't happened in Russia is that the majority of the population finds Putin's regime legitimate and 
worthy of obedience.
Viewed in terms of Weberian theory, the regime under Putin developed elements of charismatic 
leadership -  claims to legitimacy based on the personal qualities of the leader. Such an approach was 
able to work out in Russia, because "the post-communist political terrain was bleak, with long-established 
parties and few civic associations with the power, resources or willingness to build a dynamic, pluralistic, 
socially fair and democratic society" (Sakwa, 2004:315). The 'canonization' of Putin, once started by the 
public, was maintained and further developed by Putin and his regime in what many analysts (e.g. White 
& Mcallister, 2008; Cassiday & Johnson, 2010) call a personality cult.
Putin's cult rests on the idea that only a strong and tough leader can defend Russia's national 
interests, hold the multinational state together and provide economic stability. Althoughit doesn't 
present a novel mission typical for personality cults, it is a very appealing one for the Russian population. 
In this light Putin is portrayed as the only person able to complete this mission, a leader without whom 
Russia would simply fall apart, just as Stalin was presented in the Soviet Union. This claim is justified by 
arrogating the relative economic improvement of the 2000s to Putin's successful policies, rather than 
to the skyrocketing oil prices or to Yeltsin's devaluation of the ruble. The state-controlled television and 
press project Putin as the man who saved Russia from the economic and political chaos of the 1990s and 
restored national prestige long lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while opposition forces rarely 
get any good publicity and the failures of the government are blamed on the local administrations. In 
addition, to maintain the need for a strong leader, the perceptions of threat are cultivated by restoring 
Stalin-style propaganda about the country being "surrounded by foreign enemies that wish to destroy 
it, as well as lurid slogans about internal enemies serving their egotistical interests and those of the 
West"(Shlapentokh, 2008).
Putin's 'extraordinary' qualities, projected in both visual and textual media, typically include 
"sobriety, intelligence, competence, vigorous physical and psychological health and, above all, his 
manliness" (Cassiday & Johnson, 2010:686). Machismo, defined as a strong sense of masculine pride, 
has become an integral part of Putin's public image aimed to support the idea of his strength and 
superiority in all spheres of life. The image of a macho man is cultivated by various bizarre testosterone- 
fueled publicity stunts, such as tagging a Siberian tiger, flying a fighter jet, stopping wildfires, riding a 
horse bare-chested on vacation, just to name a few6. These bizarre displays of machismo appeal to the 
less educated segment of the population of Russia and project an image of Putin as a strong man in the 
most direct sense.
To support the new authoritarian political order, Stalin has been partly rehabilitated and 
brought back into the political discourse to serve as a symbol of the new regime, a despotic leader who 
nevertheless is still identified with victory in World War II and national unity (Lipman et al., 2013:29). "One 
of the possible explanations is that the Putin phenomenon constitutes part of a larger cultural trend of 
stylized expressions of nostalgia for the Soviet past that have flourished in Russia since the Soviet Union's 
demise" (Cassiday & Johnson, 2010:695-697).
Although the adulation of Vladimir Putin in contemporary Russia shows many similarities with
revolutions" in the mid 2010s, together with "tangible domestic threat posed by opposition leaders prepared to flirt with 
revolutionary politics, the proliferation of youth protest, and the latent disaffection of a mass constituency" led to Putin's 
"preventive counter-revolution" (Horvath, 2011:2).
6 A photo gallery of Vladimir Putin can be found at [http://www.rferl.org/media/photogallery/2266926.html]
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Stalin's personality cult, the development of personal worship to the level as experienced by Stalin is 
very unlikely. The power of the regime's manipulation has been greatly reduced with the development 
of internet, which in Russia as compared to China, is still relatively free of control by the state.
The case studies of the personality cults of Stalin and Putin represent a typical example of 
research done within Area Studies. In-depth analysis of historical, cultural and social contexts of the 
USSR under Stalin and Russia under Putin help to provide an explanation for a certain pattern of political 
development -  establishment of a personality cult. To the east, China, the second largest communist 
regime, also underwent a massive wave of the personality cult of Mao Zedong. Beginning in the late 
1950s, the cult lasted more than ten years, spanning some major political and social events, including 
the Great Leap Forward Movement and the Cultural Revolution. Mao was deified and worshiped to an 
unparalleled extent, leaving an indelible mark on modern Chinese history. The occurrence of the Mao 
cult was also intricately connected with China's social, economic, and diplomatic situations, as well as 
Mao Zedong's personal political status and his own perception of it.
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3. Case 2: China
3.1 Mao's personality cult
3.1.1 Rise of the Mao Cult
Image: The Mao Zedong Memorial Hall on Tian'anmen Square 
Source: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/143527/143528/10430933.html
Mao was the principal organizer and theoretician of the seizure of power and subsequent nationwide 
regime establishment for the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Chinese regime, at least before the 
1980s, was a totalitarian one, with the mass party of the CPC monopolizing control of all aspects of the 
country. The communist ideology was overwhelmingly propagated, and the flow of ideas and information 
was tightly dictated by the party. These conditions fit with the main traits outlined by Friedrich and 
Brzezinski (1956).
Veneration for Mao started long before that for Stalin. "In terms of longevity alone, Mao dominated 
the Communist Party of China for almost as long as Lenin and Stalin together exercised control in the 
Soviet Union" (Thompson 1988: 103). However, Mao himself never publicly endorsed his personality cult 
until 1958, when he attended a Politburo meeting in Chengdu7 and stated:
"There are two kinds of personality cults. One is correct, for example, we have to worship the 
correct things of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and to worship them forever. Not to worship them is not 
possible (...). Members of a squad must worship their squad leader. Not to worship is impossible (...). The 
problem does not rest with the cult of the individual but with whether it represents the truth or not. If 
it represents the truth, it should be worshipped. If it does not, even collective leadership won't work." 
(Pang & Jin, 2003: 802)
The conditions for his position change on the personality cult are generally threefold. First, 
Khrushchev's secret speech on the Stalin cult stimulated increasing reverberations. Upheavals broke 
out in Poland and Hungary in an attempt to gain more autonomy from Moscow. It prompted Mao
7 a city in Southwest China, capital of Sichuan Province.
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to reconsider his views on the 20th Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress, on the International 
Communist Movement as a whole, and also on a suitable roadmap for China that could do away with the 
Soviet model by "self-movement". He adopted the idea of a "leap" in the economic sphere, later dubbed 
the Great Leap Forward8. To boost the morale of the population to achieve the leap, the personality cult 
was to play an important part.
Second, Mao had long been dissatisfied with the dogmatism and revisionism of the party system. 
Under the impression that the CPC rule in China was enjoying overwhelming popular support, he initiated 
a rectification campaign and loosened up regulations of the public sphere, which had been under 
strict control. Critical comments were encouraged and even allowed for publication in official media; 
and the circulation of Xinhua News Agency's internal publication Reference Information 
which contained items from capitalist sources, was also widened. Mao's proposition was that after the 
socialist revolution, there were no more "antagonistic" contradictions between friend and foe in China, 
only "non-antagonistic" frictions among the people. This further stimulated public discussion. But soon 
the criticism escalated and some was even directed toward Mao himself. With the rectification ended in 
failure, Mao need to rescue his political image.
Third, the Great Leap Forward campaign caused severe disruptions. China was submerged 
in a cloud of unease and anxiety. Although Mao, who instigated the campaign, displayed gestures 
of euphemistically acknowledging negligence and made attempts to rectify the problems, he was 
confronted with much sharper criticism than expected, the most notable being that from the PLA leader 
Peng Dehuai. Afraid of losing support, especially of the army as a power base, and recalling the situation of 
the Soviet Minister of Defense Georgi Zhukov9, Mao's reaction was a drastic one. His conciliatory attitude 
toward correcting his failed policies evaporated. The Great Leap Forward policy, which the party was 
already about to correct, was re-invigorated. Concerns about his political position made Mao no longer 
willing to accept criticism from his politburo comrades if it would potentially threat his power.
Mao's promulgation of a"correct"personality cult stimulated a wave of massive flattery from other 
party leaders. The wave later spread rapidly and a cult began to grow and culminated in the Cultural 
Revolution. References and odes to Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought skyrocketed, first appearing 
in PLA publications, and later exploding across the country. Soon the cult, even by Mao's own judgment, 
became increasingly improper by calling for the worship of an individual at the expense of others. Its 
primary function was no longer a truth-seeking intellectual emancipation but the securing of personal 
loyalty to Mao, party unity, and control over the army (Leese 2011: Chapter 4).
3.1.2 Mao as embodiment of truth
To lend a mission to his cult, Mao tried to present himself as the spokesperson of Marxism and even 
of the truth in China, as one who was leading the way to China's ultimate destination (and eventually 
that of the whole world) and the way toward it. In the late 1950s, Mao repeatedly emphasized the 
necessity to overcome slavish respect for the Soviet model and "experts" in general, under the slogan "the
8 a nationwide economic and social campaign from 1958 to 1960 that aimed to instantly elevate China 
from an agrarian society to a fully communist society through rapid industrialization and collectivism. It caused a 
disproportionate development of heavy industry; agriculture and light industry were largely ignored, inducing severe 
famine across the country.
9 A renowned commander during WWII, removed from all duties after Khrushchev came to power.
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emancipation of thinking and the destruction of superstition"10. The destruction of superstition— literally 
referring to the feudalist past but also insinuating the USSR—was portrayed to be achievable through 
the worship of "truth", the nearest approximation of which was defined as Mao Zedong Thought. His 
distinction between truthful and non-truthful personality cults at the Chengdu meeting finally connected 
the quest for truth with his personality cult. Since Mao represented the truth, then there should be a 
personality cult for him rather than for someone that represents something else. To further justify his 
position, Mao invoked Lenin and said: "Some people opposed Lenin, saying that he was a dictator. Lenin 
replied flatly, it is better for me to be a dictator than it is for you" (Li, 1999: 188).
Mao and his thought soon were appraised as the "apex" of present-day Marxism-Leninism. As 
all official discourse on superstition of that period was semantically referring to a blind acceptance of 
the Soviet model, the study of Mao Zedong Thought therefore ruled out any suspicion of superstitious 
belief in the individual. Mao was perceived to have brought life to seminal works of Marxism and the 
communist ideal.
As a document of one party meeting then stated: "Following Mao Zedong from the bottom of 
our hearts is not worship of the individual or superstitious belief in the individual but the worship of 
truth; the decades of revolution and construction have proven that Chairman Mao is the representative 
of truth" (Lin, 2005: 9).
Well into the Cultural Revolution, the significance of truth was no longer remembered. Prevalent 
assessment on Mao and Mao Zedong Thought had depicted Mao as a genius, who is "much wiser than 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin," and said Mao Zedong Thought was the third great milestone after Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Mao was the "great tutor, great leader, great commander, and great helmsman" 
(Red Flag Commentator, 1966).
Mao's selection of "truth" as his mission was prudent and spoke directly to the situation China was 
facing. With the political turbulence in the Soviet Union and East Europe, China was somewhat perplexed 
about the validity of the communist ideology. The CPC, bounded in the communist system of logic, had 
to painstakingly account for the political upheaval in the Soviet Union, their "Big Brother". Mao at this 
juncture cunningly evaded the talks of communism per se and instead embarked on a philosophical 
foundation of Marxism, which is the criteria of truth. By so doing he was able to sustain a connection 
with the greater ideological environment and thus borrow legitimacy from it, and at the same time erect 
himself as a level-headed and thoughtful leader.
3.1.3 Institutionalization
Although Mao had enjoyed overwhelming reverence throughout China, a nation-wide cult of him had 
never before been an official policy. Mao's cult of personality was successfully initiated and sustained 
partly due to the institutionalized propaganda behind it. Since the founding of the People's Republic of 
China, every time the Communist Party launched a new policy, it was accompanied with a propaganda 
campaign to spread word of the policy and be able to enforce it. At the center of these propaganda 
campaigns was always Chairman Mao.
When Mao started the Cultural Revolution, he was not fully in control of the state propaganda 
machine. When he felt the need to take his cult of personality to new heights to strengthen his power,
10 Mao first suggested this slogan on the Chengdu Meeting in 1958, and reaffirmed it in Beijing on the 2nd Meeting of the 
CPC 8th Central Committee later the same year.
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Mao had to make use of other means such as official radio, newspapers and magazines (Schrift, 2001). One 
measure he used was big-character posters, which were simple white canvases with black revolutionary 
slogans. These were widely adopted by Mao to convey his political messages and helped expand his cult. 
Badges of Mao's bust were widely worn as a powerful, accessible and portable sign of devotion (Schrift, 
2001). Toward the later periods of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's cult had spread to the most remote 
areas of China, raising public support for his preaching and sending a clear message to his adversaries 
in the party and other communist leaders of the world - that he was firmly in power.
Another way Mao's personality cult was sustained was through the nation-wide publication of 
the book "Quotations from Chairman Mao", otherwise known as "Red Book of Treasure", because of the 
portable size and red color of the cover. The pamphlet was the product of an intense propaganda 
campaign started by Mao's supporters years before the Cultural Revolution began. The Red Book of 
Treasure, initially published in 1964 for use by the army to tighten intellectual control of the military, 
helped indoctrinate the population with Mao's preaching. During the Cultural Revolution, some 10.8 
million copies of the pamphlet and posters carrying Mao's quotations were printed, making Mao one of 
the best-selling authors ever (Leese, 2011:108).
o
Image: Book cover of the first edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao 
published by the People's Liberation Army General Political Department, 1964.
Source: http://book.douban.com/subject/2064814/
Rituals that originated in the People's Liberation Army were introduced to the public sphere through 
two repeated propaganda campaigns: the "Three Loyalties"11 and the "Four Boundlesses"12, prodding 
people to commit to Mao intellectually on any occasion. The propaganda was carried out by a nationwide 
hierarchy publicity organ, in cooperation with the party system in every location. These rituals were 
accompanied by daily practices such as "asking for instructions in the morning and reporting back in 
the evening", in which people would ask the Great Helmsman (Mao) for guidance and then report back
11 " £ S i " ,  namely loyalty to Chairman Mao, loyalty to the Mao Zedong Thought, and loyalty to the proletarian revolution 
route laid out by Chairman Mao.
12 "E K P B " , namely boundless worship of, boundless love for, boundless belief in, and boundless loyalty to Chairman Mao, 
Mao Zedong Thought, and Mao's proletarian revolution route.
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on their progress under the watchful eye of Mao's portrait (MacFarquhar, 2008). Mao's godly portrait - 
in addition to posters - was reinforced by his public appearances, which were not frequent and were 
usually in the form of speeches to millions of young "revolutionaries". A notable example of was when 
Mao swam across the Yangtze River on 16 July 1966, an act which received nationwide publicity. This 
symbolic activity took place happened a month after the start of the Cultural Revolution to convince 
the people that Mao, although senior in age, still enjoyed good health and had the willpower to lead 
the country and to carry out the communist feat.
It should be noted that in light of institutionalization, Mao even had his own domestic "army". 
During the Cultural Revolution Mao never relied on a secret police force to silence his opponents. Instead, 
he relied on the Red Guards to take charge of the punishment, making the mechanism subjective but 
extremely effective (Chang, 1992). "Criticizing conventions13" were held against those considered anti­
revolutionary, or just not faithful enough, in the later period of the Cultural Revolution. Public torture and 
insults, sometimes violent, proved to be an effective way to temporarily sustain and strengthen Mao's 
cult, as they could be used on peasants as well as on Politburo members. Some top-ranking officials in 
the communist party also had to attend "denunciation meetings", where they would be accused of their 
wrongdoings. This tactic was also used to eliminate Mao's political enemies.
3.1.4 After Mao's death
Mao's death during the Cultural Revolution came almost as a shock to most Chinese people, as his health 
problem had not been publicized. The purge of the Gang of Four14 - which included his last wife Jiang 
Qing - came soon after. Remaining leaders immediately engaged in a series of political struggles and 
disputed the legacy of Mao. The CPC's Resolution on "Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since 
the Founding of the People's Republic of China", issued later, lend insights into the final consensus. The 
resolution carried sharp criticism of Mao, deemphasizing him and stressing the contributions of other 
individuals. The Mao Zedong Thought was still largely acclaimed, but no longer seen as the contribution 
of Mao alone, but rather as a collective effort by many people, and Mao just happened to be the most 
noteworthy contributor (CPC 11th Central Committee, 1981). However, probably to leave room for 
successors to claim some continuity with Mao and thereby to establish legitimacy, the Resolution refrained 
from a total repudiation of Mao.
Image: Sample of a Chinese 100-yuan banknote in circulation (front) 
Source: People's Bank of China Website 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/publish/huobijinyinju/668/1590/15906/15906_.html
13 " f t ^ ^ ^ " ,  a form of public criticizing and torture, in which the alledged class enemy or political rival are forced to 
confess to various unfounded accusations of crimes.
14 " 0 A ^ " ,  a political faction composed of four high-ranking CPC officials of Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, 
and Wang Hongwen. Its political power culminated in the later period of the Cultural Revolution.
CGP Working Papers 01/2014 20
Xin Lu and Elena Soboleva Personality Cults in Modern Politics: Cases from Russia and China
Today, Mao's legacy still lingers throughout China. His portrait is printed on banknotes of various 
values, he has been compared to the Sage Kings of the classical period, and his successors repeatedly 
refer to him to reinforce their own ideological legitimacy. Today there is even a school of intellectuals 
dubbed "M aozuo"(^^, Maoist Leftists), advocating a return to planned economy, collectivism, etc.— 
policies characterizing the Mao period15.
3.2 Xi Jinping: An emerging personality cult?
Xi Jinping's prestige in China has surged since his inauguration (Lu, 2013). To say he is deliberately creating 
a personality cult is baseless, but he has taken strategies and measures that strongly resemble those 
associated with personality cults. With high popularity sparked by his tough stance against corruption, 
his prospect of a "Chinese dream", and his closer interactions with the public, it is illuminating to scrutinize 
the record of China's new boss from the perspective of the personality cult.
Xi Jinping came to power as China's top leader in November 2012. From 2013, he has been General 
Secretary of the CPC, President of the People's Republic of China, and Chairman of China's Central Military 
Commission. With this trinity of posts he is China's paramount leader. Xi faces a mega-country vexed 
by various deep-rooted challenges: corruption, slowing economy, and separatism-related disturbance, 
etc. To tackle these challenges requires a combination of complex measures. In a political system like 
China's, it also requires, as agreed by many senior CPC officials, "a more agile and forceful leader to cope 
with difficult economic restructuring, foreign policy pressures, and domestic challenges", and Xi seems 
to concur (Buckley 2013).
Effectively connecting and mobilizing the public is perhaps Xi's most urgent task (Brown, 2012). To 
better accumulate mass support, Xi has been trying to cast himself as a plainspoken and amiable leader. 
On a press meeting of the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi's first words were "I've kept you all waiting" 
when entering the venue (Tejada, 2012). The occasion was the first time standing members of the new 
CPC politburo met with the press, and so it was eagerly anticipated. Reporters as well as audiences were 
surprised by the rare occasion of hearing a new top leader express apologies, although implied. The 
gesture was widely welcomed by Internet users, who were not quite accustomed to the leader using 
folky language instead of empty jargon and slogans, which used to be the norm (Chin, 2012). On another 
occasion, Xi unexpectedly visited a local restaurant in Beijing, waited in line, ordered steamed-buns 
and stewed chitterlings, and chatted with neighbors while having lunch (Burkitt and Jie, 2013). About 
four months later, on a heavily-polluted day in Beijing, Xi appeared, not wearing a facial mask, in a local 
residential area popular among the young demographic (Chin, 2014). Both efforts to reach directly to 
the masses were well received on the Internet.
These gestures are substantially different from the wooden and opaque manner of public 
appearances of Xi's predecessors (Wan 2013). Xi realized that in the new age of social media and 
smartphones, these strategies are no longer sufficient to generate and maintain prestige and they are 
also prone to backlash. The public now demands more direct, personal relations with their leader, to 
know what kind of person he is, and where he plans to take the country, so he has to demonstrate more 
openness and earthiness. By alluding to food safety and air pollution, two very pressing issues that afflict
15 More formally this school of intellectuals are termed "New Leftists". For more info see Mishra, Panka (2006). "China's New 
Leftist." New York: New York Times, Oct.15, 2006. < http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15leftist.html> (last 
access: Jan.18, 2014).
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regular people, Xi has cast himself to the public as a more caring leader, literally living out the CPC's often 
chanted slogan "Breathing the same air, and bearing the same fate."
In addition, with regards to personal charisma, Xi did not try the usual strategy employed in 
a personality cult and present himself as possessing extraordinary intelligence, physique, or stamina. 
Instead, he opted for an alternative direction away from the emotionless technocratic face his predecessors 
usually bear. A cartoon image illustrating his work and ordinary hobbies was released by a news outlet 
affiliated with the Beijing municipal government (Patience, 2014). A remarkable contrast to the typical 
robotic image of CPC officials, this down-to-earth change in publicity served well to burnish his charisma 
as a regular bloke. The good public reception prompted a follow-up cartoon image of Xi and his wife 
Peng, illustrating their state visit to some European countries and the E.U. headquarters.
Like in any personality cult, Xi has carefully chosen a "mission" to establish his centrality. The 
"Chinese dream", a term reminiscent of the "American dream", has become the hallmark of Xi's reign. 
Xi interprets the Chinese dream as "the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", consisting of four parts: 
strong China (economically, politically, diplomatically, scientifically, militarily); civilized China (equity 
and fairness, rich culture, high morals); harmonious China (amity among social classes); beautiful China 
(healthy environment, low pollution) (Kuhn 2013). Under this banner, Xi is intentionally playing down 
the ideology card, which has largely lost appeal, and instead resorting to a clearly patriotic card, one 
tone that can resonate across the class-divided Chinese society and provide sufficient social glue to hold 
the whole populace around him.
Institutional facilitation to boost Xi's prestige remains significant. The CPC's Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection is almost the same age as the CPC itself, but it was Xi who has made thorough use of it 
and launched China's biggest crackdown on corruption since Mao, alleged to spare no "flies"(low-ranking 
officials) or "tigers" (high-ranking officials) (Oster 2014). Xi's extensive anti-corruption campaign can help 
restrain CPC's credibility loss, but it adds even more to Xi's personal power and charisma, portraying him 
as a leader capable of defeating a problem that has induced long-lasting social discontent, a problem 
that none of his predecessors has successfully solved. Moreover, Xi has been made head of the CPC's 
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and the National Security Commission 
of the Communist Party of China, two new special panels under the politburo, possibly to offer Xi a 
bypass around bureaucracies and consolidate his power. Whether the power he accrues is intended to 
clear the path for any reform he wants to push is another question. On media control, although Xi has 
seemingly adopted a more open stance, that does not mean control has equally loosened up. The regime 
still maintains scrupulous censorship of the media. Even if Xi's cartoon image was okay, when Xi visited 
the U.S. in 2013 and met with President Obama in California, Chinese micro-bloggers were forbidden 
to cite a resemblance to Xi's image with that of the cartoon figure of Winnie the Pooh, and any posted 
entry was swiftly "harmonized" (deleted) (Phillips, 2013). The comparison contained no obvious harm, 
yet the joking reference to a resemblance to a honey-loving bear surely dampened the kind of"positive" 
image Xi wishes to create, and was too much for the authorities to tolerate.
Similar to situations in today's Russia, the possibility of Xi's personality cult reaching the level 
of Mao's is not very great, as the regime is no longer in total control of education and social media, or 
flows of people and ideas, meaning there is no closed logic and discourse system. Also, intra-party power 
struggle and obstacles from vested interest groups impose hindrances when policies are formulated 
and carried out. A totalitarian regime can best boost a personality cult, but an authoritarian regime like 
China also offers multiple possible measures to generate and sustain personal charisma, and demands
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a strong central control of sorts. With all the measures Xi has taken, including a new P.R. strategy to cast 
him as a competent, determined, and amiable person, a long-term anti-corruption campaign that serves 
to restore not only the CPC's legitimacy but also Xi's own prestige, and the prospect of a "Chinese dream", 
perhaps a latent personality cult for Xi Jinping has been taking shape before people realize it.
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Conclusion
The personality cult is an important and highly interesting research topic in Area Studies. As a theoretic 
concept it borrows heavily from Max Weber's theory on charismatic authority, but it has also been 
continuously enriched by many other scholars from the perspectives of leader-follower relations, the 
leader's mission, institutionalization of the cult in modern regimes, etc. The personality cult is a salient 
feature in many countries that have been the focus of Area Studies scholars, and since these countries 
share many similarities in ideology, political system, and social policies, the personality cult serves as a 
highly illuminating and also fruitful penetration angle for area studies.
Comparing our Stalin and Mao cases, some observations can be made. To generate continuity 
from predecessors, they both invoke seminal persons and their works, but Mao was less dependent on 
this, because he had been the original national revolutionary leader. Also, the intensity of both personality 
cults reached a high point in the period of severe crisis or social disturbance. The Stalin cult culminated 
during WWII and then largely remained stable, and the Mao cult culminated during the ten-year Cultural 
Revolution.
On the other hand, there are two major differences that deserve mentioning. First, Stalin's cult 
had generally been supported by and supportive of the USSR state and party organizations, while the 
Mao cult during the Cultural Revolution had been increasingly used against the authority of the collective 
leadership of the Party. This is probably because the Stalin cult had been cultivated long before and 
had undergone several periods of tremendous external threats and internal problems, so tended to be 
better integrated into the society, but the Mao cult did not receive official endorsement until the late 
1950s, when he perceived a threat to his political power. Second, the extent to which other party leaders' 
political careers were tied to Stalin and to Mao is different. In Russia, Stalin enjoyed widespread loyalty, 
with the careers of most (if not all) potential party leaders directly tied to Stalin. But in China, potential 
party leaders' careers were attached to Mao's support and endorsement to widely varying degrees. This 
varying degree of neopatrimonialism is also worthy of consideration when comparing the two cases.
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